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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
The signing of the Iranian nuclear deal during the Summer of 2015 highlighted 
the threat of nuclear proliferation from foreign powers, but largely overlooked the rise of 
nuclear energy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). With growing energy 
demands and heightened environmental regulations, countries in this region are turning to 
nuclear power to fuel their next generation. However, the rise of nuclear power in the 
MENA region holds serious implications for the future of the area’s energy, economic, 
and social reforms that have largely gone unexplored as a whole thus far. The purpose of 
this thesis is to explore the impact of nuclear energy on regional economies through 
assessing the oil market and uranium supply and demand and analyzing the societal 
impacts through examination of job growth associated with such a large scale project and 
the advancement of education, research, and the rights of women in response to the new 
industry.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 2015, the P5+1, consisting of the five permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council and Germany, signed a landmark deal to limit Iranian 
progression towards a nuclear weapon and free that country of cumbersome economic 
sanctions. (Peralta, 2015) The deal came after months, if not years or decades, of 
tumultuous debate. Many countries from Israel, Saudi Arabia, to members of the P5+1 
itself believed that any nuclear deal would ultimately allow Iran to build up its nuclear 
knowledge enough to build a nuclear weapon. Much of the text of the deal itself 
addresses this very issue, including regular monitoring of the nuclear energy facilities and 
restrictions on the production of certain grades of fuel. Though a deal was struck many 
months ago, headlines continue to portray the doom of an imminently nuclear Iran.  
 Yet, for all of the discussion about weapons proliferation, very little of the deal 
and discussion surrounding it actually had to do with the production of nuclear energy 
itself. The mere existence of nuclear energy in Iran is a Pandora’s Box of impacts on the 
Middle East / North Africa (MENA) region, of which weaponry is but one effect to leap 
out. The Iranian deal did not just mean nuclear energy in Iran; it opened the possibility of 
nuclear power in countless states across the MENA region that have lusted after nuclear 
power for years, unable to produce the technology to make it happen, but signing 
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documents of intent with foreign powers nonetheless as a sign of their impending 
industrial advances.  
 The potential rise of nuclear power in the MENA region has been overlooked 
largely in part to its overshadowing association with oil. Not all MENA countries seeking 
nuclear power are oil giants and of those that are, most are seeking to move away from 
domestic oil consumption. Oil will not last forever and the more oil these countries 
consume, the less they have to export, constraining their GDP and limiting the longevity 
of their reserves. Despite the plethora of oil wealth associated with this region, most 
rising nuclear powers are seeking such technology to make themselves more energy-
independent regardless of whether they have domestic oil supplies or not.  
As of yet, a collective analysis of the impacts nuclear energy would serve on the 
MENA region is largely nonexistent. Considering the eminency of its rise in coming 
decades, further analysis of nuclear energy in this region is warranted. This thesis will 
examine the impacts the rise of nuclear power will have on the future of the energy 
consumption and the social climate of the MENA region by addressing the question: 
‘How will the socio-economic standing of MENA countries be influenced by the rise of 
nuclear power?’ The impacts include the current status of progress of MENA region 
nuclear programs; oil production and consumption; the future of the uranium market; the 
impact on science education and research in the region; the potential growth of the 
workforce; and opportunities for women in the field. While in reality there are numerous 
arenas that will impact the success of these nuclear programs, the aforementioned factors 
give the most well-founded reasoning for why MENA economies will turn to nuclear 
energy and how that will in turn shape their population. Notably absent from this list is 
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politics, the scope of which could constitute another thesis entirely. In isolating the 
addressed factors from outside political aribitrars, this thesis largely deals with what 
would be best for a given country in an ideal world independent of uprisings and regime 
change. While politics cannot often be predicted into the future, the factors addressed in 
the following text can, making them ideal for analysis.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STATUS CHECK: THE STATE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN MENA COUNTRIES 
The International Atomic Energy Agency claims that fourteen MENA region 
countries are planning on implementing nuclear power: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, 
Kuwait, Yemen, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and 
Sudan. These nations are at various stages of implementation, ranging from merely 
considering a nuclear energy program to nearing completion on reactor construction. 
Additionally, some nuclear energy programs are more likely to be fulfilled than others 
due to factors such as economic ability and political stability. In reality, only one country 
(the UAE) has actually begun construction on a nuclear power plant. Three more have 
signed deals with western powers to receive assistance in building infrastructure to 
implement nuclear energy. Some have seen tremendous success and progress in as little 
as a decade, while others have been struggling to kick-start a program for half a century. 
The descriptions below provide more detail for MENA’s most promising nuclear 
programs. The criterion of ‘promising’ can be assessed based on significant investment 
from the country towards a power plant or construction made on a facility. This does not 
mean that the other programs will never succeed. Rather, it means that nuclear energy is 
not enough of a priority at this point for these countries; if they really wanted to be a 
nuclear power, they would have made more significant strides towards establishing 
themselves as such.  
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United Arab Emirates  
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) might be the most promising emerging nuclear 
power, if only because it is the only country to actually begin construction on a power 
plant. In 2009, the UAE signed $20.4 billion deal with South Korea to build four nuclear 
reactors and develop peaceful nuclear energy. (Namatalla, 2009) Each reactor will 
provide 1400 MW for a total of 5600 MW, which is expected to fulfill 25% of the 
country’s energy needs.  The plant is expected to be completed by 2020, with the first of 
the four total reactors coming online by 2017. (Namatalla, 2009) UAE is often seen as a 
model of nuclear power in the region because the country has renounced any intentions to 
obtain nuclear weapons:  In 2009, the country announced “domestic legislation to 
permanently forego the acquisition of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing 
capabilities….[which is] reflected in its 2009 ‘123’ nuclear cooperation agreement with 
the United States, whose language concerning no enrichment and reprocessing is often 
referred to…as the nonproliferation ‘Gold Standard’." (Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.) By 
renouncing nuclear weaponry for military purposes and taking a peaceful approach to 
nuclear power, UAE has earned powerful allies like France and the United States that are 
supposed to serve as a deterrent in case of nuclear conflict in the region, such as from 
Iran. In doing so, the UAE has indicated its intentions are geared towards energy 
independence, not using its nuclear power to gain influence and power in the region. This 
notion is confirmed by acknowledging that unlike many other countries, UAE has 
actively considered other forms of renewable energy. “In assessing its options for 
meeting future electricity demand, the UAE evaluated a comprehensive list of options in 
addition to nuclear energy, including natural gas-fired power plants, crude oil-fired power 
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plants, and coal-fired power plants, as well as alternative and renewable technologies 
including waste-to-energy [biofuels], solar, and wind. Head-to-head comparisons 
between these technologies demonstrated the benefits of nuclear energy as a cost-
competitive and environmentally friendly form of base-load power generation.” (Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 2008) In considering other options, the country is making an 
appeal for nuclear power not based on prestige or to prove their influence in the region. 
The aforementioned article explains that UAE found nuclear energy to be a low-cost 
alternative to fossil fuels. UAE seems to have carefully considered the benefit of nuclear 
energy for the country and perhaps then, the future impacts of geological waste disposal 
as well.  
In general, the country is hoping to mitigate some of its fossil fuel consumption 
by transitioning to nuclear energy. Like several members of petroleum exporting 
countries (OPEC), UAE relies heavily on burning its domestic oil supplies in order to 
keep pace with energy demands. One of the largest factors accounting for this energy 
consumption is water desalination. UAE has one of the highest rates of water desalination 
in the world at 3,682 cubic meters a day. (Ho Sik Kim, 2015) Due to their expanding 
agriculture and industrial sectors, water demand is projected to grow to 5,910 cubic 
meters a day by 2030, meaning the country has to nearly double its water desalination 
capacity within the next fourteen years, reflecting the substantial population growth that 
is projected across the MENA region.  
Using nuclear power for water desalination means that the country does not have 
to burn oil in order to power these facilities. Oil accounts for at least a fifth of UAE’s 
gross domestic product. (GDP) (World Bank, 2011) Therefore, burning oil for functions 
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that could easily have a different energy source is not a wise move for UAE; years down 
the line, their oil production and exports could be substantially decreased due to high 
modern-day consumption. Without assuming that the country would diversify its 
economy before such a point was reached, a 20% decrease in GDP could have 
dramatically negative impacts on the country’s economy.  
In addition to signing deals with foreign powers, UAE has also made strides 
towards building up its domestic nuclear energy program for the future. With the help of 
the Emirati Nuclear Energy Commission (ENEC), nuclear engineering programs have 
been established at Abu Dhabi Polytechnic and Khalifa University (Malek C. , 2014) 
(Khalifa University, n.d.). Additionally, hundreds of Emirati students also study nuclear 
engineering in foreign countries. Education is especially vital considering that the country 
had no prior nuclear engineering curriculum. Investing in education means that future 
generations of nuclear engineers can be educated domestically and that the program can 
eventually become self-sustaining.  
 
Saudi Arabia  
Though Saudi Arabia has yet to actually begin construction on a power plant, it 
has signed several deals that could make them one of the most significant nuclear powers 
in the Middle East. (Bahgat, 2012) While Saudi Arabia is typically seen as a major oil 
producer, and therefore should not have any problems with meeting energy demands, 
domestic energy consumption has dramatically increased in the country in recent decades 
because of the growing population and growing power consumption.  Saudi Arabia has 
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very little family planning and subsequently, has one of the fastest growing populations 
in the world; within the last twenty years alone, the population has nearly doubled. The 
country’s energy intensity, or energy per unit GDP, is four times that of Britain or 
Germany; the country consumes the largest amount of energy in the world. (Hino, 2015)  
If the trend of recent years continues, energy consumption in Saudi Arabia will triple by 
2032, meaning that the country has to have three times the power output within the next 
two decades. (Bahgat, 2012) Like UAE, Saudi Arabia currently obtains most of their 
energy through burning oil reserves. While the country has plenty of oil to burn right 
now, using its resources in this manner could substantially impact its economy years 
down the line. “At their current rate of domestic consumption, Saudi Arabia’s oil 
available for export will decline nearly 30% by 2028 while global demand continues to 
rise.” (Bahgat, 2012) (Saudi Arabia facts and figures, 2016) A Brookings Institute study 
predicts that Saudi Arabia could become a net oil importer by 2030 or 2038 if it does not 
curb domestic oil consumption. (Hino, 2015) Considering that nearly 45% of the 
country’s GDP can be attributed to oil revenue, a substantial decrease in oil production 
without diversification will have dramatically negative impacts on the country’s 
economy, not to mention on the international oil market, of which Saudi Arabia is a 
major contributor.   
Saudi Arabia has considered implementing nuclear power for decades beginning 
in the 1970s. (Bahgat, 2012) In 2011, the country announced plans to build sixteen 
reactors by 2030, providing 20% of domestic electricity consumption. Several deals have 
been made with western nations for assistance in building a nuclear program and the 
kingdom has established several domestic education and research facilities to investigate 
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the feasibility of nuclear energy within their borders. Despite these efforts, however, a 
concrete deal for constructing a power plant has yet to be established. When asked about 
nuclear efforts in Saudi Arabia, a member of the government responded, “I supposed 
[we] would build a modern nuclear power plant but so far we have seen no action in 
practice but a couple of agreements signed between the City and such countries as the 
US, Russia, China, France and South Korea.” (News, 2016)  
 
Egypt  
On paper, Egypt appears to be an extremely promising emerging nuclear power. 
In November 2015, Egypt signed a deal with Russian company Rosatom for the 
“construction and operation of Egypt’s first nuclear power plant at El-Dabaa. The deal 
covers the development of a plant equipped with four 1200 MW reactors. The aim is to 
produce nuclear energy as early as 2022.” (HSBC, 2016) The deal also includes “fuel 
supply, used fuel, training, and development of regulatory infrastructure.” (Emerging 
Nuclear Energy Countries, 2015) Included in this complex will be a water desalination 
plant, which “can produce up to 170,000 𝑚3 of fresh water per day from one nuclear 
power unit.” (Rosatom, 2015) In total, Egypt has spoken of intentions for at least four 
nuclear power reactors with a goal of operational use by 2022, a rather ambitious feat 
considering their starting point of zero industrial reactors. However, Egypt does have 
experience with nuclear reactors in general. The country has two research reactors that it 
has used to investigate nuclear energy in order to study how it could be implemented in 
the country and develop the technology and infrastructure that would need to accompany 
it. In general, Egypt has significant experience in laying the ground to progress towards 
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nuclear power: “Egypt set up its Atomic Energy Commission in 1955….in 1978 plans 
were drawn up for ten reactors by 1999.” (Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries, 2015) 
However, while Egypt may be well versed in creating nuclear energy plans, it is less 
experienced in closing the deal. Over the years, numerous efforts to establish nuclear 
energy, independently or with the help of an external power such as Russia, have 
surfaced and faltered for various reasons, from the Chernobyl accident in 1982, to 
political turmoil in 2011. Under several regimes, Egypt has signed nuclear agreements, 
but has yet to sufficiently act and establish a nuclear energy program. If Egypt is waiting 
for political, regional, or world stability before it begins construction on its reactors, their 
nuclear sector might be on hold for quite some time. Current president Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi was democratically elected in 2014 (by those who were not protesting the election) 
on the shoulders of the military, which ousted former president Mohammed Morsi in a 
military coup in 2013. This came just two years after the Egyptian Revolution, fueled by 
the Arab Spring, overthrew then-president Hosni Mubarak in 2011. As the Islamic State 
(Da’esh) continues to occupy nearby Syria and Iraq and spread terror in other regional 
countries like Turkey and Tunisia, Egypt may have difficulties in finding a golden 
opportunity of domestic and regional peace.  
However, building amidst a backdrop of potential instability will not be the only 
problem to face Egypt. Without prior experience in building a reactor, Egypt will need 
outside aid to develop its nuclear infrastructure. Despite possessing 2 MW Russian and 
22 MW Argentinian research reactors, typically an indication of a robustly developing 
nuclear program, the country has yet to develop a domestic nuclear energy plan without 
outside help. (Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries, 2015) Regardless of their possession 
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of these devices for 55 and 19 years, respectively, most of Egypt’s nuclear energy 
initiatives since the 1980s have relied on the help of Russia, South Korea, or other 
outside entities. Fortunately, the country has one strong mechanism to develop a local 
engineering workforce: an established educational program. Alexandria University has 
had a nuclear engineering program since 1963; a quick search of publications from this 
department produces 170 results within the last year alone. (Google Scholar, n.d.)  
(University, 2012) While the department may not have always been as active as it is 
today, this activity holds strong promise for the future. Since Egypt has not started 
building yet, now is the time to start training the engineers necessary to oversee the 
projects and establish the plans. President al-Sisi thinks he will be the one to do it. The 
Economist explains, “Egypt’s long dream is coming true, says [al-Sisi]. Not the dream of 
a capable government or good public service, but the one in which the nuclear energy 
program started in 1954 finally produces a watt of usable power.” (Wasting Energy: 
Nuclear Power in the Middle East, 2015) Despite Al-Sisi’s declaration of confidence, 
numerous Egyptian leaders have tried and failed to tackle nuclear power over the years, 
making Egypt’s greatest difficulty in rising to a status of nuclear power following 
through on its commitments. Once a plan is established, their highly educated workforce 
will enable the program to thrive with little outsourcing of foreign workers.  
 
Jordan 
Most of the MENA countries are turning towards nuclear power to build for the 
future, whether that means having reserve power for a growing population or switching to 
a more sustainable form of energy to preserve oil supplies. However, Jordan is turning 
 12 
  
towards nuclear energy in hopes of becoming energy independent. Currently, more than 
25% of its national budget is allocated to imported energy, meaning that unlike its oil-
rich neighbors that are net energy exporters, Jordan is a net energy importer. (Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, 2008) As a result, the country claims to lose approximately  
$3 billion every year due to energy. (Al-Jazeera, 2015) This is largely because Jordan has 
virtually no domestic energy production and imports 97% of its energy. (Seeley, 2014) 
Violence in the region has frequently “threatened and in many cases, completely cut off 
electricity supplies in Jordan,” which is problematic considering so little of their energy 
comes from internal sources and therefore, little is available to feed into the power grid in 
case of outage. (Al-Jazeera, 2015) Jordan’s energy needs are projected to grow in coming 
years due not only to their growing population, but also the growing refugee population 
within their borders. Seeley explains, “Jordan is the constant recipient of refugees from 
the region’s crisis zones. The kingdom hosts some 600,000 refugees from Syria, as well 
as tens of thousands of Iraqis, and a few thousand from other nationalities.” That number 
has grown as the Da’esh continues to occupy Syria: between January and December of 
2015, the number of refugees in Jordan increased by nearly 200,000, including over 
35,000 refugees that did not receive assistance from the UNHCR. (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2015) Even without the addition of refugees, Jordan’s 
Energy Ministry predicts that total energy demand will grow by 50% and electricity 
demand will grow by nearly 75% in the next five years. (Seeley, 2014) At this rate, 
energy demand could become 37 – 45 % of Jordan’s national budget if it continues as an 
energy importer. Therefore, finding a reliable form of domestic energy is imperative for 
the country’s future growth. The country has several assets that would make it a good 
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candidate as a nuclear state, the most notable of which are its relative political stability 
and its uranium resources. The Council on Foreign Relations explains that Jordan has 
been spared much of the political turmoil of the MENA region that has erupted since the 
Arab Spring because their “moderate, non-ideological, and revolution-adverse political 
culture is a strong mitigating factor.” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013) Aside from 
the influx of refugees, Jordan has largely avoided the conflict that has besieged this 
region and that would turn away foreign investment. In 2015, Jordan “signed a $10bn 
deal with Russia to build the kingdom's first nuclear power plant, with two 1,000-
megawatt reactors,” with a goal of construction being complete by 2022. (Al-Jazeera, 
2015) Considering that Jordan currently uses about 15.18 TWh of energy, or 1.518 
million MWh, the reactors will only account for a fraction of Jordan’s energy needs. 
(International Energy Agency, 2013) However, the proposed plan will utilize Jordan’s 
domestic resources. Khalid Toukan, head of the Jordanian Atomic Energy commission, is 
“optimistic that the raw materials, the yellow cake, will come from Jordan." (Al-Jazeera, 
2015) Jordan’s uranium sources have been minimally explored, but are estimated to 
constitute 70,000 tons of uranium oxide. (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2008). The 
site does have limitations that stem from Jordan’s location isolated from water sources. 
“The site chosen by Jordan for two planned reactors…lacks water (necessary for cooling) 
and local tribesmen object to it.” (Wasting Energy: Nuclear Power in the Middle East, 
2015) Both of these factors could serve as limiting factors when it comes to the potential 
of the nuclear program.  
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Syria  
Considering the current occupation of much of the country by Da’esh, the political 
turmoil between the government and rebelling forces, and the mass displacement of its 
citizens, it is logical that Syria is not likely to be a major nuclear player anytime soon. 
Similar to Egypt, Syria had nuclear aspirations in the 1980s that dissipated with the 
Chernobyl incident. (Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries, 2015) In the early 2000s, 
Syria did actually build a reactor: it was believed to be a gas-cooled reactor similar to one 
used for plutonium in North Korea and subsequently, was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike 
in 2007. The call for nuclear power was renewed in 2011 when the country published a 
proposal for a power plant to be constructed by 2020. However, with the Arab Spring 
uprisings and a civil war emerging in the same year, the plan has not made notable strides 
in recent years.  
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CHAPTER 3 
OIL GIANTS: THE END OF AN ERA 
The gulf region (and by extension, the entirety of the MENA region) is often 
associated with its huge influence on the global oil market. Though not every MENA 
country is a prominent oil producer, fossil fuels do constitute a large portion of several 
economies in this region. As a whole, MENA region countries comprise 47% of global 
oil production and 58% of OPEC supply. (OPEC, 2014) However, as oil prices have 
declined in recent years, the MENA region needs to reconsider its energy strategy if it is 
to avoid economic catastrophe. Without substantial energy reform, towards nuclear 
power or any other alternative energy, “The International Monetary Fund recently 
predicted that Saudi Arabia could run out of cash in five years or less if oil stays below 
$50 a barrel.” (Long, 2016) While these countries might not consider energy reform 
without a sweeping solution, nuclear power provides the large scale capacity to phase out 
oil, while bringing its users more prestige and political maneuverability than oil could 
ever have. Although it may seem irrelevant to discuss oil subsidies in a paper about 
nuclear energy, it is imperative to acknowledge that the purpose of nuclear power is to 
curb oil consumption, allowing some degree of subsidies to persist as oil sales continue. 
Nuclear power allows oil producing countries to maintain their level of exports and 
sustain domestic energy consumption rates, thereby preserving the standard of living in 
this region. The removal of these subsidies in the short term is necessary to acclimate the 
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population towards a lower energy consumption in an effort to ensure that implementing 
nuclear power can actually have an effect on domestic energy consumption. Analyzing 
the mechanisms of oil production, consumption, and export are necessary to understand 
how nuclear power will shape and preserve the economies of oil giants. 
  
Oil Production  
Eight members of the MENA region belong to OPEC. Due to their historically 
high production of oil and the duration of their production, it would seem as though many 
of these countries would run out of fossil fuels sometime in the near future. However, 
when one reservoir is consumed, oil companies simply go looking for another. Ali Al-
Naimi, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, explained, “Our 
reserves have not decreased. Through new discoveries and improved recoveries, we are 
adding as much oil as we are producing every year,” indicating that many of these 
countries could sustain their production for years, if not decades, to come. (Watkins, 
2011)  Compounding this longevity is the recent slump in oil prices, which has slowed 
gulf oil production to some extent. As a result, the Financial Times explains, “Meeting 
demand in Asia and other emerging markets for oil has boosted the Gulf’s capacity but, 
in spite of a price recovery, the regional industry still operates significantly below 
output,” while The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies reiterates that 
Saudi Arabia has a “large idle production capcity.” (Wigglesworth, 2011) (Bahgat, 2012) 
Because of lower prices, MENA oil production has already slowed, indicating its 
capacity to draw out production.  
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Something must be done to curb water consumption in the energy sector, as 
Climate Change explains, “Continued development along a fossil-fuel intensive 
pathway…. would mean that the energy sector would have to find sources for roughly 
five times the amount of water than it requires today.” (Kestin Damerau, 2015) This is 
one of the largest reasons for a push towards nuclear energy: desalination. As domestic 
water demand and extracting oil becomes more difficult, more clean water will 
undoubtedly be needed, and burning such a profitable substance to get it is scarcely 
logical. While nuclear power does use water to cool its reactors in older designs, the 
water can usually be recycled, meaning that the water that has to be desalinated or 
purified again (as oil extraction water undoubtedly does) is minimized. Nuclear 
desalination plants are often incorporated into plans for general nuclear reactors in this 
region: in several versions of Egyptian plans for nuclear power over the years, most 
included large desalination plants. The same is true for water-scarce Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia. For oil production to continue to have net positive oil gains, rather than simply 
sustaining its own production, an alternative water source will be necessary. Nuclear 
energy will likely never replace oil in this region; however, it can serve as an aid to 
ensure that as much oil possible is being freed for export, rather than simply sustaining its 
own existence.  
Yet, as oil production continues and more accessible sources are consumed, 
getting the oil becomes more difficult. In oil production alone, “over time water needs 
increase in conventional oil reservoirs as it shifts from primary to secondary and finally 
tertiary extraction…. The largest factor driving [the increase in water use] is the rising 
water demand for unconventional fossil fuel extraction.” (Kestin Damerau, 2015), 
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indicating that an increased amount of water will be needed for energy production in the 
future. However, oil extraction is already water intensive: 76% of freshwater 
consumption in the MENA region can be attributed to oil extraction. (Kestin Damerau, 
2015) Freshwater is already scarce in many of the arid climates of the gulf, in which the 
primary water source might instead be saltwater. Therefore, desalination is required just 
to process the oil. Unfortunately, desalination itself is a very energy (and oil) intense 
process, essentially amounting to a process of using oil to desalinate water, which is used 
to extract oil, which may later be used to desalinate water. Depending on the returns in oil 
produced based on the oil consumed by water desalination, this process probably is not 
efficient. However, desalinated water is not only needed during oil extraction, but 
electricity conversion and emissions mitigation as well. “Water is mainly required for the 
cooling systems of thermal power plant…. Additional water demand occurs – especially 
for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies that rely solely on wet cooling 
systems at this time, which in turn require considerable amounts of water.” (Kestin 
Damerau, 2015) Aside from agriculture, energy is one of the most water-intensive 
processes used by the MENA region today.  
 
 Impact on the Oil Market 
As mentioned, one of the primary reasons for heavy oil producers to invest in 
nuclear technology is to consume less of their own oil. Saudi Arabia consumes 1.3 
million barrels per day more than a decade ago, meaning oil production has had to be 
substantially increased in recent decades to keep up with domestic and international 
demand. Saudi officials agree that mass domestic consumption has become problematic 
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for the oil industry. As Hashem Yamani, director of the King Abdullah City for Atomic 
and Renewable Energy explains, “Rising domestic demand alone will ultimately limit the 
export capacity of the kingdom, and of development.” (Watkins, 2011) If the dramatic 
increase in domestic demand continues into the future, the country has to either increase 
production to maintain their previous level of exports or export less. Sustaining either 
trend over the long term could become detrimental to their economy: since fossil fuels are 
a non-infinite source, increasing production could mean going through the fuel 
substantially quicker and despite exploration for new sources and switching to secondary 
or tertiary extraction, the point at which there is no more fuel to produce could come 
more quickly than anticipated. President of the Saudi oil company Saudi Aramco Khalid 
Al-Falih explains, “The oil availability for exports is likely to decline to less than 7 
million barrels per day by 2028, while global demand for oil will continue to rise.” 
(Bahgat, 2012) Thus, diversification away from fossil fuels can be seen as a move 
towards sustaining oil-dependent economies and stretching the duration of their fuel 
available for export years into the future. This trend is already emerging, exhibited 
through deals for construction on nuclear power plants. The Wall Street Journal explains, 
“Oil rich states …. want to diversify their energy mix and keep as much oil possible 
available for export…. Nuclear energy also could help free up more oil for export and 
eliminate the need to import natural gas. The nation generated 45% of its electricity from 
natural gas and 55% from oil as of 2012, according to the International Energy Agency.” 
(Anderson, 2015) By orienting domestic consumption more towards nuclear power, large 
amounts of oil could be freed for use on the international level.  
 
 20 
  
Oil Subsidies and domestic consumption  
 Domestic consumption of fossil fuels has sky-rocketed in recent years as oil 
becomes a more primary energy source for power generation and people use more 
electricity. The purpose of nuclear power is to replace oil as an electricity source, thereby 
freeing oil for export. With such a high rate of electricity usage, a large source of power 
is needed as a replacement on a scale at which only nuclear energy is currently a feasible 
option. Since oil is such a large portion of many domestic GDPs, low petroleum prices 
have caused difficulties for nations who depend on that revenue, even forcing Saudi 
Arabia to “draw on reserves and issue bonds for the first time in nearly a decade.” 
(Vivian Nereim, 2015) This problem is only exacerbated by growing domestic energy 
use, making a two-pronged solution necessary to preserve more oil for the global market: 
decrease oil in the percentage of energy generated and decrease electricity use overall. As 
The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies explains, “The Saudi government 
needs to adopt a comprehensive approach to introduce and implement energy reform. 
This means increasing public awareness of the pros and cons of alternative energy, lifting 
subsidies, and curbing demand. Broad and sustained educational and media campaigns 
are needed to reach all segments of the population.” (Bahgat, 2012) This paper would 
advocate for nuclear energy comprising a larger portion of energy generated; however, 
the issue of getting people to use less power is much harder to address. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary; nuclear power takes a long time to develop, meaning that countries will have 
to rely on oil as a fuel source until their reactors come online. If energy consumption is 
not curbed, the pace of nuclear energy construction cannot possibly keep up with rising 
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demand for the electricity it generates, leaving domestic oil supplies to pick up the slack 
and requiring that their current level of domestic consumption be maintained.  
Currently, many MENA countries that produce oil also subsidize it within their 
domain. Buying a liter of gas in Saudi Arabia, for example, is much cheaper than buying 
it at market value.1 The National explains, “Riyadh has decided to step up petrol prices 
by up to 60 per cent… and to increase electricity prices for heavy users…. US pre-tax 
petrol prices reached a high of $0.94 per liter in 2008, which has now fallen to about 
$0.38. Saudi petrol prices, raised by 60 per cent, now stand at $0.24 for higher-grade fuel 
– still short of world market levels, but a change that would have been unthinkable in 
2008.” (Mills, 2016) Many countries have been selling oil to their constituents at heavily 
reduced prices. When fuel is cheaper, it is logical that people would use more of it, or 
would at least be less concerned about their level of fuel use. This is believed to be a 
primary force behind the rise in fuel consumption: since it is cheap, the consequence for 
using massive amounts of oil is rather small. The National continues, “artificially cheap 
energy has engendered inefficient, wasteful machinery, vehicles, habits, building designs 
and urban layouts. These cannot be fixed in a hurry.” (Mills, 2016) The low price and 
ready availability of oil has created a culture in which energy is used without 
consequence or second thought. These countries can change policies but unless people 
can transition to a culture of energy conservation, policy will have little impact.  
Citizens not only see subsidies at the pump, but also in their wallets. The oil 
industry has generated billions of dollars in subsidies that have been given to different 
                                                          
1 1 gallon is approximately 3.8 liters 
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beneficiaries at different times. “Before reforms, Egypt spent more on fuel handouts than 
health, education and infrastructure combined. “ (Mills, 2016)  These subsidies vary by 
country. In Saudi Arabia, they have included: subsidized gas, free health care, free 
education, subsidized water and electricity, no income tax, public pensions, large scale 
government employment, higher pay in government jobs than in the private sector, 
unemployment benefits, and a development fund that facilitates interest-free loans to help 
home purchases and start businesses. (Long, 2016) Reconsidering these services could 
make up for lost revenue in the country’s GDP: “eliminating energy subsidies would 
wipe out most of the kingdom’s deficit.” (Mills, 2016) However, removing the subsidies 
could threaten regional stability. This large-scale support from the government is thought 
to be one reason that Saudi Arabia avoided the political unrest seen during the Arab 
Spring of 2011. As Long continues, "Part of the leverage the regime has had on their 
people is that they don't impose taxes and therefore people don't expect representation," 
Jordan says. "But once they pay taxes, you're likely to see an increase in political 
unrest…. When the Arab Spring rocked the Middle East in 2011, the Saudi king spent 
even more in an effort to subdue any discontent in the country." (Long, 2016) While 
relying more heavily on citizens to pay for previously subsidized services could account 
for the deficit Saudi Arabia is facing due to a dramatic decrease in oil revenue, it could 
also cost these countries their citizens’ loyalty.  
Some countries, in contrast, are seizing the opportunity of low oil prices to make 
domestic reforms. “In July before prices started to fall, Egypt announced plans to start 
phasing out its massive energy subsidy program. Since July, the government has saved 
roughly $7 billion, or about 2 percent GDP. The country now plans to eliminate all 
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subsidies within five years and devote the savings toward health and education.” (Plumer, 
2015) Although Egypt is not exactly an exemplar of regional security, it is one of the few 
that has already begun phasing out energy subsidies. Maria van der Hoeven, executive 
director of the international energy agency, explains, “Low oil prices present an 
opportunity for policymakers to accomplish goals that would otherwise be more 
politically or economically difficult…. While prices are low might be a good time to 
think about carbon taxes.” (Plumer, 2015) Van der Hoeven is recommending an all-at-
once approach that will likely harm economies in the short term, but allow healing to 
begin more quickly. This plan probably will not win Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or other 
regimes the support of the upper class and oil barons, who benefited disproportionately 
from oil subsidies. However, it may help those to whom the government has the greatest 
responsibility: the poor. “Energy subsidies tend to be an inefficient way to help the poor 
anyway – only about 8 percent of the benefit of fossil fuel subsidies goes to the poorest 
20%.” (Plumer, 2015) These countries have the opportunity and excuse to reform 
financial assistance in their country and redistribute it towards those that could actually 
use the help, especially since “the subsidy cuts won’t have a ‘large effect’ on people with 
low or middle income.” (Vivian Nereim, 2015) Depending on what Saudi Arabia actually 
ends up cutting, it could wind up with more problems than countries that have already 
made adjustments. Saudi Arabia has extremely high unemployment; “official statistics 
put it at about 12%, but experts say it is likely much higher since many Saudis do not 
even look for work.” (Long, 2016) If unemployment subsidies, implemented in 2011 to 
meet demands indicated during the Arab Spring, are cut, protests and political unrest 
could ensue.  
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CHAPTER 4 
URANIUM MARKET: SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
Many countries seeking nuclear energy do so to gain energy independence or 
move away from a fuel-based power supply. However, while nuclear energy itself is 
largely devoid of oil or hydrocarbons, it does require reliance on a nuclear fuel. As the 
Carnegie Middle East Center explains, “If the nuclear motivation for some countries is to 
strengthen their energy security by reducing exposure to energy imports, that worry will 
remain, albeit in a new form.” (Nakhle, 2016) Nuclear power, by nature, requires fuel 
dependency. Fortunately, like oil, uranium is relatively abundant and inexpensive on the 
international market. Due to ongoing discovery of new mines, uranium “is not predicted 
to deplete promptly, unlike fossil fuel, which is expected to deplete after 8 decades.” 
(Hasan Jamil AlFarra, 2011) Unfortunately, few of the MENA countries pursuing nuclear 
power actually have uranium sources. Nakhle continues, “Just four countries – Australia, 
Canada, Kazakhstan, and Russia – hold more than half of the world’s uranium. In sharp 
contrast, the MENA region is uranium-resource poor. Only Jordan (0.5%), Algeria 
(0.3%), and Egypt (less than 0.1%) have uranium resources.” (Nakhle, 2016) 
 Additionally, the aforementioned MENA countries do not currently have facilities 
that produce uranium ore. Should they, or any country wishing to purchase uranium from 
a MENA supplier, mine their uranium for commercial purposes, they will need to place 
substantial investment into facilities able to accomplish that in terms of both time and 
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money. Like a nuclear power plant, getting a uranium mine takes time to bring online 
(though not quite as much as its aforementioned counterpart).  
Based on the current demand, there is enough uranium globally to last the nuclear 
industry for another two decades without adding new sources. In order to secure a supply 
of uranium for decades into the future, investment and construction needs to begin within 
the coming years. Fortunately, a surge in new reactors is expected to "drive the strongest 
uranium demand growth in decades…. grow[ing] 61 percent to 238 million pounds by 
2025". (Brush, 2015) Investment and interest in nuclear power from the MENA region 
could be the boost the international market needs to jump-start uranium mining once 
more. In recent years, new uranium mining has slowed with the decline of nuclear energy 
in the west, particularly after the Fukushima disaster in Japan. Brush explains, “Given the 
weakness in uranium prices, companies have been taking mines off line and not investing 
in new ones. [Ux Consulting Company] projects a nearly 49-million-pound gap between 
global demand for reactors and mining production by 2019. (Brush, 2015) As deals 
between MENA countries and industrial, nuclear states begin to roll out, many prominent 
world powers are restarting their investments in uranium. China, which recently signed a 
deal with Saudi Arabia, is one such example. “In recent years [China] has been active in 
acquiring uranium assets abroad as well as obtaining advanced western nuclear 
technology, which it hopes to begin exporting during the coming decades.” (Said, 2012) 
For MENA countries, however, importing from China will be no different from 
importing uranium from Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, or Russia unless they can 
bargain for some sort of deal to accompany a power plant purchased from the country. If 
they are looking for a closer ally, they need look no further than Jordan. Though the 
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country has made explicit strides towards growing a nuclear power program, perhaps 
even more promising is its emerging uranium industry. The Nuclear Threat Initiative 
explains, “Jordan is believed to have approximately 79,000 metric tons of uranium-ore 
reserves.” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016) For a point of comparison, the average 
American reactor consumes 530,000 pounds of uranium each year (Virginia Uranium 
Incorporated, n.d.) Most MENA countries are only constructing a couple of nuclear 
reactors, especially in the short term. Therefore, Jordan could become a prominent 
uranium supplier in the region. As the Nuclear Threat Initiative continues, “There are 
sufficient uranium reserves in central and southern Jordan to meet the demands of the 
country’s planned nuclear program for 150 years.” (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2016) 
Since the nation only has plans for constructing two reactors right now, it is likely that it 
will export excess supplies. It would be logical for countries like Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE, both of whom are planning much larger nuclear power programs, to get their 
uranium from a closer source. The Jordan Times explains that the uranium mining 
facilities were designed by Jordanian experts and will aim to produce 300-400 metrics 
tons of yellow cake in its initial, start-up phase; as the facility comes online at full 
capacity, it is expected to produce 1,500 tons annually. Planning for the facility began in 
2015 and scouting the location of the uranium sources has been ongoing for years; 
subsequently, the Jordanian government has confirmed that “the central area of Jordan, 
about 80 kilometers south of Amman, is home to 36,389 metric tons of uranium oxide 
that is easily mined and can be extracted cost effectively.” (Gahzai, 2015) When 
questioned as to whether Jordan would consider providing uranium to external powers, 
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Samer Kahook, general manager of the state-owned Jordan Uranium Mining Company, 
stated, “This factory can ensure supply to these states.” (Gahzai, 2015) 
Introducing dozens of new nuclear power plants could potentially overwhelm the 
uranium market. Therefore, it is imperative that uranium production keep pace with the 
rising number of power plants. As more states commit to nuclear power, the uranium 
market will likely regain confidence, spurring new investment and the construction of 
new plants. However, not all construction is equally beneficial for rising MENA nuclear 
states. A new uranium mine in China would require the same amount of trade and degree 
of extensive import as buying uranium from Russia or even Canada. In contrast, building 
economic relations with Jordan through the uranium trade not only provides a more local 
supplier, but guarantees that the profit of such a transaction stays within the region. 
Jordanian profits will encourage more Jordanian investment, potentially in the nuclear 
industry, in ways that Chinese profit and investment would not. A regional fuel supply in 
Jordan could prove extremely beneficial towards accelerating the growth of nuclear 
power in the MENA region.   
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CHAPTER 5 
INCREASE IN SCIENCE EDUCATION AND RESEARCH INITIATIVES 
 Regardless of the country, one of the first requisite priorities of a nation with 
nuclear energy ambitions is to build its nuclear education programs within the country. 
Having a local workforce knowledgeable in the field is critical to the future success of the 
program because, as the IAEA dictates, “The responsibility for safety cannot be delegated 
to another country or organization.” (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2011) There 
are other reasons why countries would want a strong presence of domestic workers in 
their nuclear programs, however, including loyalty to the nation, longevity of the 
program, keeping nuclear engineering knowledge within the country to avoid future 
reliance on outside powers, and overall economic growth. These factors, associated with 
the work force, which will be addressed in the next section, all depend on a strong 
education program.  
 Building an entire nuclear engineering educational program from scratch poses a 
lot of challenges. Countries who can afford to do so have often opted to instead send their 
first generation of nuclear engineers abroad to be educated. Unfortunately, this is not 
really a sustainable practice: sending students abroad can be expensive and results in 
profits being exported to foreign universities rather than being kept domestically and 
comes with the risk that students might not return to their country of origin. In most 
cases, countries establish some sort of nuclear education, even if they do continue to send 
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students abroad. Although nuclear engineering programs are relatively uncommon in this 
region, STEM programs are not. While some number of nuclear engineers will be 
needed, the total number actually required is only a fraction of the nuclear workforce. 
Brookings explains, “only 20 to 35 percent of the workforce required for a civil nuclear 
energy program need to be educated to a college-degree level, and of this number, only 
20 percent need to have a background in nuclear engineering.” (John P. Banks, 2012) If a 
nuclear power plant has 1000 people, 650-800 do not need a college education and 200-
350 do. Of those that need to be college-educated, 40-70 must be nuclear engineers. Out 
of a plant of 1000 people, then, current STEM programs would suffice to educate 200-
350 of them, and additional nuclear energy curriculum would be required for a mere 40-
65.   
While the infrastructure for nuclear education already exists, developing 
independent programs will require additional expense. Not only does this include what is 
taught in the classroom, but also requires professionals to develop the lessons and goals 
for the major, and then execute them. While such personnel exist in other countries with 
fully-developed nuclear programs, it can be difficult to recruit them to start new 
programs. “Countries looking to develop indigenous capacity face the significant 
challenge of establishing and staffing universities, colleges, and other training facilities at 
great administrative and financial expense.” (John P. Banks, 2012) While these countries 
might get the talent they are looking for to start a new program, many come with a hefty 
price tag.  
Even if the program has been arranged, a final hurdle comes with enrolling 
students. For nuclear education initiatives in the MENA region, “programs are having 
 30 
  
difficulty in recruiting students with the minimum levels of educational attainment 
necessary to complete a nuclear-related course of study.” (John P. Banks, 2012) Studying 
nuclear engineering is no easy feat; students need to have a solid foundation in math and 
sciences if they are to succeed in this field. If they are lagging behind, it can be difficult 
for them to catch up and therefore, for them to be retained within the program. Without a 
remedial program, students may have to take classes over or repeat lower level classes to 
ensure their proficiency. When Brookings surveyed a nuclear engineering class in UAE, 
they found that “current figures suggest 32 will graduate on time, 47 will be kept behind 
at least once and thus cannot graduate on time, and 21 will leave education permanently.”  
Brookings found the primary factors motivating these statistics to be the public school 
curriculum coupled with the high dropout rate, both of which “severely restrict the 
number of national students able to enroll at high status universities without an initial 
foundation year prior to embarking upon formal undergraduate study.” When one of the 
largest national universities in the UAE raised its admissions standards in 2012 on par 
with other institutions internationally, this problem manifested in “a sharp downturn in 
the number of students eligible to enroll.” (John P. Banks, 2012) If expanded to a larger 
sample, this means that the initial size of a given graduating class will decrease by 
approximately 60% over the course of the students’ education. While these numbers 
certainly are not good for nuclear education, they are better than allowing students to 
continue with a subpar education. In the aforementioned study, Brookings found, “in at 
least one case, the curriculum of a nuclear-related higher education course has had to be 
adapted to accommodate the underperformance of enrolled students. The mismatch 
between the demands of nuclear-related training and education courses and the abilities 
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of prospective and incoming students has the potential to negatively affect both the 
Emiratization goals and the longer-term sustainability of the UAE’s civil nuclear 
program.” (John P. Banks, 2012) Lowering standards provides substantial risk to the 
credibility of the institution, as well as the overall safety and integrity of the nuclear 
engineering program itself. In the future, it might be wise for MENA nuclear education 
programs to follow some sort of accreditation on par with international guidelines.  
Different countries have made varying levels of progress in terms of their nuclear 
education initiatives. The programs are detailed below.  
 
UAE 
Since the country has the funding to do so, UAE is encouraging students to study 
nuclear engineering-relevant fields through scholarship programs sponsored by the 
Emirati Nuclear Energy Commission (ENEC). Currently, more than 400 students are 
studying as a result of ENEC support and scholarships (Malek C. , 2016). Programs 
available within the country include a nuclear engineering master’s program at Khalifa 
University and a Higher Diploma in Nuclear Technology at Abu Dhabi Polytechnic. 
(Khalifa University, n.d.) (Malek, ‘It is an amazing experience’: first batch of Emirati 
nuclear energy specialists to graduate, 2014) The scholarship incentive is proving 
successful within the country, as The National found, “Emirati students now favor 
science in higher education because they believe it gives them the skills to excel in 
work.” (Mustafa, 2012) Students are studying science and technology fields at higher 
rates because of the scholarship program. While this may not necessarily be limited to 
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nuclear engineering fields alone, this means that more of the Emirati population is 
becoming educated, perhaps leading to more technology advancement in the region in 
general even outside of the field. Part of the surge in technology interest can be attributed 
to efforts on the part of ENEC not only in terms of money, but also in diversifying their 
target audience. ENEC has initiated a program that begins exposure of promising STEM 
students to nuclear energy-relevant fields in high school: “11th-grade high school 
students are given the opportunity to travel to Korea during the summer to study practical 
and theoretical aspects of the civil nuclear industry. The annual program was first offered 
in the summer of 2010. In 2012, 36 high school students made the 12-day visit.” (John P. 
Banks, 2012) Beginning this interest early will facilitate the interest of the youth in 
nuclear energy and perhaps lead them on a path towards success.  
In terms of nuclear education in particular, however, it appears as though most 
ENEC scholars are not studying in Abu Dhabi. The most recently available data shows 
82 students have graduated in nuclear engineering from Abu Dhabi Polytechnic and 
fewer than 10 are currently enrolled in the master’s program at Khalifa University 
(Khalifa University, n.d.) (Malek, ‘It is an amazing experience’: first batch of Emirati 
nuclear energy specialists to graduate, 2014). In comparing the numbers, that means that 
more than 300 students are opting to study elsewhere. More students are heading to the 
US and France to study, especially for advanced degrees like masters and doctorates. 
While this is good for the sustainability of nuclear knowledge in the country, it is not 
good for the state of nuclear education unless some of those educated come back to 
support the Emirati nuclear education efforts. If students have to be educated somewhere 
else, UAE is left dependent on foreign help to sustain their nuclear program  
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Saudi Arabia  
Although Saudi Arabia has several science and technology schools, none offer 
nuclear engineering in terms of reactor operation. King Abdullah University of Science 
and Technology was founded in 2009 as a result of growing interest in nuclear power. 
(Bahgat, 2012) Despite the original intentions of the program, however, their closest field 
to nuclear engineering is physics. King Abdul-Aziz University offers nuclear 
engineering, but only for radiation protection and medical physics. (King Abdul-Aziz 
University, n.d.) The subject is not available for women, who are divided into a separate 
girls’ school and can choose from either industrial or electrical/computer engineering. 
(King Abdul-Aziz University, n.d.) In general, women are segregated from men in the 
sciences in Saudi Arabian education. “Education is single-sex from kindergarten through 
to doctorates; King Abdullah University of Science and Technology is the sole 
exception.” (The Economist, 2014) Although some women are allowed to study abroad 
without a chaperone, the strict rules imposed by the Wahhabi government may limit the 
future educational opportunities for women in nuclear sciences: if it is hard enough to get 
one nuclear education program, it will be even more difficult to get many integrated into 
the womens’ universities. The King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, as 
mentioned, may be a possible exception since it is gender-inclusive.   
 
Jordan  
In terms of established nuclear energy education, Jordan stands out as one of the 
most flourishing. Brookings found that “the country has 25 universities (10 public and 15 
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private) offering BSc degrees in physics, chemistry, biology, health physics, electrical, 
mechanical, industrial, chemical and nuclear engineering. In addition, there are 35 
community colleges (15 public and 20 private).” (John P. Banks, 2012) The large basis of 
education means that Jordan could easily build up the level of expertise needed to 
implement a nuclear energy program and could easily find the personnel. Additionally, 
“The Jordan University of Science and Technology (JUST) established a nuclear 
engineering department in 2007 to train future reactor operators by offering a five-year 
BSc course of study with 160 credit hours. The program has four faculty members and is 
equipped with radiation detection labs. The program has 145 students and the first batch 
of 19 students graduated in June 2011.” (John P. Banks, 2012) This large population of 
interested and graduating students demonstrates that Jordan has the domestic numbers to 
get a nuclear plant running. However, while interest has been strong in the past, it is 
currently waning due to lack of initiative in a nuclear program from the government and 
political aversion to nuclear energy. Brookings continues, “JUST continues to fill the 20-
25 positions available for its BSc in nuclear engineering each year, but interest in nuclear 
studies among students has waned; there are more students looking to expand or switch 
their field of study, especially into renewable energy.” (John P. Banks, 2012) While the 
numbers for nuclear studies may be there now, there is no guarantee that the educational 
interest will be there in the future.  
 
Egypt 
As previously mentioned, Egypt has a nuclear energy program at the University 
of Alexandria that has had a research reactor at some point in time. However, no growth 
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in the extent of the educational programs in recent years has occurred.  Egypt’s current 
security and stability concerns make further initiatives unlikely at present. 
 
Research Initiatives 
There are two research initiatives that stand out as entities largely independent of 
any given university; these organizations might be the equivalent of a national lab or the 
Center for European Nuclear Research (CERN), a collaboration from many countries in 
the EU. On the part of Saudi Arabia, the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy was established in 2010 to “build a sustainable future for Saudi Arabia by 
developing a substantial alternative energy capacity.” (The Establishing Order, 2016) 
Since then, the organization has made several assessments on nuclear energy feasibility 
and policies, as well as collaborating with various international organizations to gain 
experience in the nuclear arena. Saudi Arabia recently donated $10 million to launch a 
center to combat nuclear terrorism in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. (Saudi Gazette, 2016) Saudi Arabia claims the collaboration is an effort to build 
a “strategic partner[ship] to provide technical support, necessary knowledge and 
experience for organizing the Saudi atomic energy sector and providing it with necessary 
training of human resources, in order to establish an independent national authority for 
nuclear regulation.” (Saudi Gazette, 2016) Partnerships such as these will undoubtedly be 
helpful as Saudi Arabia seeks to establish a nuclear framework within their nation and 
increase their product of nuclear-related research. However, in terms of already-
accomplished findings, it is unclear what research has yet to be produced from the 
organization. While it appears to have potential for great success in the future, perhaps 
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more direction is needed. The organization has the potential to build up independent 
nuclear research in the country and perhaps serve as a first step towards establishing 
nuclear education as well.  
While Saudi Arabia has taken on the national lab approach, Jordan has taken the 
route of an Arab-world CERN. In terms of regional initiatives, Jordan is currently 
constructing the Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the 
Middle East (SESAME). The lab, which is “based in Amman and is scheduled to be fully 
operational in 2015, includes Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, the 
Palestinian Authority and Turkey among its membership” (John P. Banks, 2012) The 
synchrotron itself was donated from Germany’s Deutsches Elektronen-Synchrotron in 
1997 and relocated to Jordan, where its name pays “homage to the ‘open sesame’ 
command to unlock a treasure trove in the tale of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves.” 
(Kelley, 2015) The project has yet to be affected by regional strife and politics that beget 
the member states. Moreover, the project is anticipated to help keep scientists in the 
MENA region, whereas they may have previously gone to Europe or the United States to 
find adequate jobs. Installation of the device in the Jordan facility and initial 
commissioning for use is expected to being this year. (CERN, 2015) Such regional 
collaboration will foster new findings in the nuclear sector and could perhaps also 
encourage emerging nuclear states: if a country has successful nuclear research, nuclear 
energy may not seem as insurmountable. As nuclear energy ability grows within MENA 
countries through similar efforts, the outside help that MENA countries receive to kick-
start their own programs might not come from the West in the future, but perhaps from 
more experienced nuclear countries within their own region, made more knowledgeable 
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by substantial research efforts. Jordan has also been spearheading a move to create the 
Arab Network of Nuclear Regulators, in an effort to ensure that nuclear energy in the 
region is held to the same standards in the West and is as safe as possible. The 
establishment of such an organization is especially important because nuclear incidents, 
no matter what the scale, tend to deter public support of nuclear power.  
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CHAPTER 6 
WORKFORCE GROWTH POTENTIAL 
For all emerging nuclear power countries, investing in a nuclear energy program 
will undoubtedly lead to a boost in employment in technical fields: the process creates 
jobs in the initial construction, and will sustain many more as the plant goes into 
operation. However, supporting a surge in public sector employment is easier in some 
countries than others. Many factors contribute to the ultimate impact the growing nuclear 
industry will have on the number of jobs created, primarily the available education, 
governmental financial capability, and the size of the desired program. The relationship 
between employment and the nuclear sector can also be reciprocal: while the industry 
will create jobs, the plan for employment and aspects of those employed, including their 
nationality and level of education, can also be a sign of the success of the given nuclear 
program. Ultimately, while new jobs in any sector are a good thing, keeping them local 
may be even more important. The Brookings Institute explains, “overreliance by 
newcomer countries—especially those looking to develop significant nuclear energy 
programs—on external expertise leaves such countries susceptible to sustainability risk.” 
(John P. Banks, 2012) 
Unsurprisingly, establishing the number and type of people needed for a program 
is one of the first requisite steps that a country takes. The Brookings Institute explains, 
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“workforce planning is a vital process in ensuring that specific institutions have the 
capacity to carry out the wider national objectives of the civil nuclear power program.”
(John P. Banks, 2012) Of the countries that have been mentioned as serious contenders 
for nuclear energy (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt), only two have actually 
established the numbers they need to make their plan happen: UAE and Jordan. Simply 
calculating the necessary number of personnel can be seen as one of the indicators of a 
promising nuclear power: if a country is not worrying about such a vital and rudimentary 
detail as that, their plan clearly has not been hashed out enough yet. In terms of available 
statistics, much of the information in this section comes from UAE and Jordan, meaning 
that any information relevant to Saudi Arabia and Egypt must be extrapolated.  
UAE predicts their nuclear program will require “between 900 and 1,000 ‘pre-
operational’ staff by 2016, a combined workforce of around 1,400 preoperational and 
operational staff in 2017 when the UAE’s first reactor is projected to come online, and a 
permanent operational staff of around 2200 in 2020, when the country’s four reactors are 
scheduled to be operational.” (John P. Banks, 2012) In the short term, plant construction 
has created 15,000-20,000 new jobs (depending on the fiscal year). While these jobs 
obviously are not permanent, they are rather long term; although all of the units are 
scheduled to be complete by the end of the decade, this timeline is rather ambitious for a 
new country, especially given the difficulty nuclear energy has faced as a whole in recent 
years. Prolonged construction is good for those employed in the process, assuming they 
receive adequate pay and treatment. In terms of long-term numbers, 2000 people does not 
seem very substantial; for an Emirati population of 1.4 million, this figure amounts to 
0.14% of the population. ENEC has stated that their goal is 60% Emirati employment, 
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meaning that realistically, approximately 1300 new jobs are being created. (Mustafa, 
Female nuclear scientist set to enter record books, 2012) The Korean company associated 
with the project, KEPCO, has stated otherwise; “KEPCO is to provide up to 60 percent of 
the operating staff for the plants if necessary.” (John P. Banks, 2012) This would put the 
number of Emiratis employed at less than 900. Of this breakdown, Emiratis employed by 
ENEC might not even be in charge. This figure includes nuclear engineers, but also 
mechanical engineers, computer scientists, and general technicians, the latter of which 
typically do not play a large leadership role and therefore, have smaller salaries.  
While 900 people employed sounds good, it is rather insignificant in comparison 
to the numbers of people in the ENEC scholarship program, which currently supports 
more than 400 students domestically and abroad. (Malek C. , 2016) Unless UAE is 
planning on pulling the plug on the program within the next few years, of which the 
country has given no indication, it could wind up with many more educated people than it 
needs. As has been seen in Egypt and countless other places during the Arab Spring, an 
idle youth with few options for societal advancement and employment is not good for 
political stability.  
The balance of Emirati and expatriate workers are largely affected by efforts by 
the UAE government to engage in ‘Emiratization,’ a “nationwide program launched 
nearly a decade ago to effectively assimilate the UAE national workforce in the labor 
market.” (Abudhabi E-government, 2016) Emiratization stands around 60-70% of the 
public sector workforce, but varies depending on the industry and is much lower than the 
goal of 95% Emirati employees set for 2014. In contrast, “in the private sector, the figure 
is less than 10 percent, despite the government having set quota targets for specific 
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industries such as banking, insurance, and trade.” (John P. Banks, 2012) Since the nuclear 
program will be state owned, albeit with substantial assistance from South Korea, it will 
likely engage substantially in Emiratization, and might be pressured to have high rates of 
Emirati citizens. If this were to be the case, UAE needs to make sure it has adequate 
support and personnel to engage in this policy. Brookings explains that in other industries 
in which Emiratization was encouraged in the past, there often were not enough people in 
the field to follow through with the objective: perhaps an oil company could not find 
enough petroleum engineers or electrical engineers, so they hired more expatriates than 
they would have liked. The only consequence for doing so is a fine, which international 
companies gladly paid to continue business undeterred. However, opting for a fine 
instead of finding the Emirati workers undermines the policy of Emiratization, potentially 
destroying any increase in employment associated with a growing nuclear industry. The 
nuclear industry is especially susceptible to this because of its large dependence on 
foreign workers. “With expatriates responsible for key aspects of the nuclear program 
and related institutions, and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future, an aggressive 
Emiratization policy in the civil nuclear sector comes with significant risk.” (John P. 
Banks, 2012) The nuclear industry, however, is different in that it requires a substantial 
level of start-up education, as demonstrated in the previous section, meaning there will 
likely be more people with degrees relevant to the nuclear industry than perhaps any 
other given industry. In this sense, the high number of graduates expected to evolve from 
the program could mean a higher rate of Emiratization than average. The nuclear industry 
could serve as an example for other industries to train local workers and build up 
education relevant to their fields instead of importing talent from elsewhere.  
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While the number of people expected to be employed by Jordan’s nuclear power 
program is significantly smaller than UAE, it is perhaps more realistic in the scope of the 
country’s nuclear ambitions. Jordan estimates it will require “321 total staff by 2014.” 
(John P. Banks, 2012) This is about a third of the realistic Emirati number; however, 
Jordan is aiming to have their program completely staffed by natives. While UAE can 
simply import their talent to sustain their program due to their strong financial status, 
Jordan does not have that luxury; “Jordan does not have the financial resources to import 
external skills in large quantities. In recognition of these realities, the Jordanian 
government has focused primarily on training and education, with a long-term goal of 
having its nuclear program—both at the regulatory and operational levels—staffed 
primarily with Jordanian nationals.” (John P. Banks, 2012) This is exemplified through 
the large number of nuclear engineering and technical programs within Jordan. However, 
focusing on education in the short term means that nuclear power progression is being 
postponed to a long-term project; while UAE has set construction goals, Jordan has few 
building plans, most of which appear more theoretical than concrete. Fortunately, Jordan 
already has a strong STEM education system, even if its graduates are not trained in 
nuclear-related fields. “While the country’s universities produce over 8000 graduates in 
scientific fields each year, Jordan does not currently have a sufficient base of domestic 
personnel with the professional and technical skills required for the development and 
implementation of a nuclear power program.” (John P. Banks, 2012) Thus, while a 
transition from STEM to nuclear sciences will be necessary to cultivate a work force, it 
will be easier than in countries that have to also establish and grow STEM education first.  
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This process will be aided by external involvement, albeit on a much smaller scale 
than in Saudi Arabia. As Brookings explains, “As a matter of policy, JAEC [Jordan 
Atomic Energy Commission] is also requiring external vendors and consultants to 
provide training as part of their activities… [as well as] outside specialist contractors to 
assist in the early phases of the nuclear power program.” (John P. Banks, 2012) However, 
the smaller number of foreign workers to help initiate the process, compared to a country 
like UAE that was able to import as many workers as necessary, likely contributes to the 
lack of progress seen in comparison.  
Despite their intentions to rely heavily on domestic workers, Jordan may have 
difficulties in hiring those workers and establishing a domestic nuclear workforce. 
Budget cuts, deficits, and hiring freezes in recent years means the country does not have a 
lot of room for growth, even if the government would like to give the nuclear energy 
industry priority. As a result, “sufficient funds have not been allocated to hire more 
professionals…. in practice the Commission has not recruited any new technical staff 
since 2010” (John P. Banks, 2012) In failing to get off the ground and establish a firm 
industry, Jordan could be running out of time in which it could act with national support 
to become a nuclear nation. The current indecision, lack of direction, and financial crisis 
has fostered “doubts about the long-term sustainability of the civilian nuclear program for 
those thinking about a professional career in the industry, and has the potential to tarnish 
the prestige of the program as a high-level national endeavor threatening the 
establishment of indigenous capacity over time.” (John P. Banks, 2012) The lack of 
success seen in this field has affected not only the future field, but also current 
professionals. With few jobs in the nuclear industry at home, many Jordanians are going 
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elsewhere for employment, namely to UAE. Brookings explains that Gulf countries are 
an appealing option for professionals: “For qualified Jordanian professionals in many 
disciplines, employment in the Gulf can offer starting salaries for recent graduates three 
to four times higher than those at home; for senior professionals it can be ten times 
higher.” (John P. Banks, 2012) Though Jordanians may want to stay within their country, 
they may find the benefits elsewhere too good to pass up. Without an adequate number of 
jobs in this field, the industry could continue to be drained of talent in Jordan, despite the 
solid educational foundation that is typically a strong first step towards nuclear energy.  
With the exile of nuclear scientists likely goes some of those most outspoken in 
favor of nuclear energy and those most likely to advocate for it. In light of the Arab 
Spring, it would be wise for the government to act with the people’s support, especially 
for such a large endeavor that will undoubtedly face more hurdles in the future. While 
nuclear energy has the potential to help all of the people of Jordan, the youth in particular 
may have difficulties in seeing its short term benefits. The unemployment rate for youth, 
defined as the population between ages 15 and 24, is over twice as high as the national 
average: 30%, of youth are unemployed, while the unemployment for the general 
population is around 12%. (The World Bank, 2014) For those unemployed without 
significant education, especially in a STEM field, jobs in the nuclear industry are likely 
far out of reach. With such a high rate of unemployment, spending billions of dollars on 
something that will not produce substantial job growth may not seem justifiable. This is 
especially critical considering that such a large percentage of the population is classified 
as youth: approximately 40% of Jordanians fall in or around this category. (John P. 
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Banks, 2012) If the nuclear industry cannot find a way to incorporate more of the youth, 
it might be a hard sell amongst a demographic struggling to succeed.  
As to the nuclear work force currently projected by the Saudi Arabian 
government, the prospects can be adequately summed by The Bulletin of Atomic 
Scientists: “To date, the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-
CARE) has scouted out foreign suppliers and developed regulatory frameworks—but 
gone no further down the nuclear path… Riyadh lacks the human capacity to develop and 
operate its own nuclear infrastructure in the foreseeable future.” (Tabatabai, 2015) Like 
UAE, Saudi Arabia has the oil money to fund the program if it starts soon. However, with 
the declining price of oil, the government is already having to make substantial cuts, 
meaning those they could employ right now would likely be small in number without a 
large push of prioritization.  
Egypt, on the other hand, is in a situation similar to Jordan: there is at least some 
educational background in the nuclear field. As with Saudi Arabia, however, employment 
numbers cannot grow without a plan of employment from the government.   
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CHAPTER 7 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN NUCLEAR 
 An emerging sector is an ideal place to implement progressive policies and 
practices that could lead to greater social reform. Without an already educated workforce, 
nuclear energy provides the opportunity to begin men and women on similar footing, 
giving the latter a greater chance to excel than in other fields in which a precedent has 
already been set. There is only one nuclear program that is operational to any degree, 
making the UAE the only case study to look at in this example. In general, it is hard to 
characterize how one specific factor, such as the introduction and funding of a new 
industry, affects the treatment and rights of women in a given country in the MENA 
region; while some may credit rising job growth and employment for women in recent 
decades due to more educational opportunities for women, for example, one could also 
say the trend is due to the Arab Spring or more exposure to Western cultures through 
globalization. Therefore, although analyzing one case study is helpful in determining how 
women’s rights and treatment will progress in other nations as a result of an influx of 
nuclear energy and nuclear-related opportunities, the factors that help propel the status of 
women in one country might not exist in another, or might not have the same impact.  
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 In the UAE, the Emirati Nuclear Energy Commission currently employs nearly 
350 female employees, or 21% of its total work force. This number is higher than the 
global average. (Hill, 2015) (Malek C. , 2016) The large number of female workers is 
reflected in the large number of women in education: “More than 29 per cent of the 
students in ENEC’s Pioneers Scholarship Program are also female. This figure increases 
to 34 per cent in the Higher Diploma in Nuclear Technology program.” (Hill, 2015) 
Despite the oppression that women may have faced in past centuries and even decades, 
women appear to be advancing in the nuclear industry. However, there are two things to 
consider when analyzing these promising numbers. Initially, the female employee 
statistics are not limited to engineering fields or Emirati students. The numbers simply 
describe a general demographic of ENEC employees, of which 60% are Emirati. 
(Mustafa, Female nuclear scientist set to enter record books, 2012) In turn, there would 
be approximately 200 Emirati women working for ENEC, which is still a sizable number 
regardless. However, this number includes women of all positions, whether or not their 
job requires an advanced technical degree. This consideration is important because 
different positions come with varying levels of seniority and associated treatment; for 
example, a female reactor operator might garner more respect than a female office 
employee at the same plant. While it can be difficult to gauge societal perception without 
a direct poll questioning Emiratis in the plant of their views towards women, there are 
several external factors that can be observed. Amani Al Hosani, the UAE’s first female 
nuclear engineer, explains, “My family understand that my job is really demanding and 
they support every step I take… Women do not need to be ‘superwomen’ to juggle a 
nuclear career with the demands of motherhood… ENEC understand the important role 
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of the woman as a mother so they are very flexible.” (Hill, 2015) Since women are often 
characterized by their motherly duties in Muslim societies, the ability of women to 
surpass the status of caregiver is indicative of their increased social regard. Both ENEC 
and male coworkers seemed to have acknowledge that Al-Hosani is more than a mother: 
she is a valuable member of the engineering team and a respectable professional. As 
women like Al-Hosani take on more prominent roles within nuclear power plants, they 
are likely to gain more esteem in the eyes of not only their employer, but also their male 
co-workers who must acknowledge their role in the overall team to ensure that the plant 
operates as efficiently as possible. Regardless of their numbers, women in nuclear 
engineering in UAE have made significant strides towards making themselves more 
prominent in the nuclear industry. Emirati women have established a branch of the 
organization Women in Nuclear, which is now nearly two years old. (Malek, UAE 
women in nuclear industry celebrated, 2015) Though this might not seem like a 
substantial advance, forming a group in which women can discuss their experiences and 
ambitions can be productive for them to help each other advance. While not analogous 
with a union, the group could serve as a platform for women to discuss how their industry 
should be shaped to be more conducive to their needs and how to achieve those goals. 
Today, 29-34% of UAE nuclear students are female, higher than the global average and 
certainly better than the United States, where 18-23% of nuclear engineering students are 
female, depending on the degree (Hill, 2015) (Yoder, 2011).  
 While Saudi Arabia does not have any nuclear engineers as of yet (male or 
female), it does have a growing population of female engineers in other fields. Saudi 
women now outnumber men in domestic universities at 51.8%. (Saudi Gazette, Riyadh, 
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2015) As previously noted, women and men study at separate institutions, with the 
exception of the King Abdullah University of Science and Technology. In recent months, 
many of these women have gone to the private sector and worked on hundreds of 
projects: “engineering and décor companies are hiring female Saudi [engineers] ... to 
work on vital projects. …Four Saudi women engineers are working on designs for a 
number of major projects, which will soon be launched by the Jeddah Governorate.” 
(Arab News, 2013) It sounds as though women have a vital role to play in emerging 
technologies in the kingdom. However, their specific role may be limited by traditional 
societal norms. While female engineers do work alongside male counterparts, their 
“important role [is] in adding the final touches to projects.” (Arab News, 2013) There are 
undoubtedly examples of women treated as equals in their workplace; yet, others are 
singled out for conforming to gender norms. Feda Abdullah Al-Majed, a recent graduate 
in management information systems from Jubail University College in Saudi Arabia, was 
part of a team that took first in the first hackathon held in Dubai in 2015. She has also 
been recognized for creating Girly Talk, a beauty and lifestyle blog, an idea “that won her 
first place for the 2014 Business Ideas Competition at her school.” (Durrani, 2015) 
Despite her success as a coder, Al-Majed has chosen to follow up with her blog. She has 
opened an online store to sell makeup and cosmetic bags, and plans to open a physical 
store. (Durrani, 2015) While entrepreneurship is a great skill to have and demonstrates 
independence on the part of the woman, it seems misplaced that someone with such talent 
in information systems would instead opt to open a makeup store, which may not provide 
as many opportunities to utilize those computing skills. In order for women’s worth in the 
workforce to be acknowledged, they first must recognize their own skill and ability.  
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 An increase of women in education does not translate to women employed in 
engineering fields, and does not mean those women will have leadership roles that will 
elevate their status in society. The nuclear industry cannot hire professionals to ‘put the 
finishing touches’ on projects; in a field that requires strict regulation and a high level of 
expertise, all employees need to be functional and diligent. A society that does not see 
women as such may have trouble integrating them into the nuclear industry. Wes 
Schwalje, chief operating officer of Tahseen Consulting in the UAE, says that women 
"still face significant challenges in the workplace that leads to segmentation into select 
fields….  Some of these challenges include sociocultural barriers, such as ideas about 
appropriate work and how much men and women should interact in the workplace.” 
(Durrani, 2015) Women can make themselves available through education, but it will 
take a shift in how society views their role to integrate them into industry.  
 However, a change may be in the works. Soumaya Tebbi, a manager working for 
an oil and gas company in the UAE explains, “I have witnessed many companies 
implementing a diversity policy to increase the number of women at the workplace 
especially in technical fields, so the opportunities are waiting out there.” (Durrani, 2015) 
Aggressive workplace and perhaps even national policies will be needed to fully integrate 
women on the scale seen in the Western world. This will likely be facilitated by the 
industry’s exposure to capable women. As women become a larger percentage of nuclear 
engineers in this region, they are likely to take on more responsibility within the plant and 
therefore, more leadership as well. This is beneficial not only for the women themselves, 
but also future female nuclear engineers. If more women are visible in a given field, 
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young girls and other women will see that job as being more attainable, enabling 
increased enrollment in studies relevant to the field.  
 Looking at the UAE and Saudi Arabia can offer a good sense of how women can 
progress through education in nations influenced by Islam. However, Egypt and Jordan 
were less affected by fundamentalist trends, indicating that perhaps the upward mobility 
of women in these countries is more likely should they gain prominent roles in an 
emerging nuclear industry.   
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 In analyzing the impacts and indicators of introducing nuclear energy into a 
country, it is apparent that some programs are more imminent of others. For the 
implications discussed, the visibility of the results is likely to correspond to the efforts 
put in from the country in question: no country can establish the energy independence 
they seek through nuclear power without beginning construction, training their 
workforce, and brokering deals with other nations to help them achieve their goals. 
Unfortunately, nuclear energy takes time: while a country may receive short term 
economic prosperity and political peace by tapping a new oil source or building a solar 
field, only nuclear can provide the long-term success that will bring about the 
aforementioned results. 
 Nuclear energy has the potential to drastically shape the future of the MENA 
region not only in terms of energy security and economic prosperity, but also gender 
equality, educational opportunities and technological advancement. As countries see the 
advantages this power source poses through its implementation in Iran and the UAE, 
more will likely take the final plunge between contemplation and commitment to reap the 
same benefits. The MENA region will not shy away from the higher standard of living it 
has grown accustomed to, making nuclear energy imperative as nations seek to further 
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their prosperity. Nuclear power from Arab nations will not fade away; western society 
needs to acknowledge its imminent rise and either facilitate the process or step aside.   
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